This blog was originally started to better help me understand the technologies in the CCIE R&S blueprint; after completing the R&S track I have decided to transition the blog into a technology blog.
CCIE #29033

This blog will continue to include questions, troubleshooting scenarios, and references to existing and new technologies but will grow to include a variety of different platforms and technologies. Currently I have created over 185 questions/answers in regards to the CCIE R&S track!! Note: answers are in the comment field or within "Read More" section.

You can also follow me on twitter @FE80CC1E

Sunday, March 24, 2013

IDP - FN, TN, TP, FP

I have talked with a few security administrators that seem to struggle with the understanding of FN, TN, FP, TP. I have decided to try to create a simple method to remember.

True/False = This either CORRECTLY or INCORRECTLY identifies an attack
Positive/Negative = This performs and event that takes an ACTION or is ACTION-LESS

True Positive (TP) - A legitimate attack (CORRECTLY) which triggers an IDP to produce and alarm/alert or mitigate the risk (ACTION)

False Positive (FP) - An IDP believes there is an attack taking place (INCORRECTLY) and produces an alarm/alert or mitigates the risk (ACTION).This can cause disrupt legitimate traffic and flood your IDP with alerts drowning real alerts that may be taking place. Some traffic that may cause false positives include:

  • Legitimate applications that do not follow RFC's 
  • Legitimate traffic in one part of an organization that may not follow normal behaviors in another part of the organization causing alerts. 
  • Signatures that we written poorly and identify both legitimate and illegitimate traffic. 

False Negative (FN) - There is an attack that has NOT been identified (INCORRECTLY) and no alarm/alert/mitigation was raised (ACTION-LESS). This causes a false sense of security. This can be caused for a variety of reason which may include:

  • Signatures miss variations or poorly written
  • Obfuscation of an attack on the fly -zero day
  • Overloaded IDP 

True Negative - (TN) No attack has taken place (CORRECTLY) and no alarm raised (ACTION-LESS).

Saturday, March 23, 2013

Testing AAA Authentication with ACS - Part 1

Confirming that local authentication on the switch and ACS is working after you finished your configuration perform the following:

Run the "test" command on the switch
sw1#test aaa group tacacs+ ro PASSWORD legacy
Attempting authentication test to server-group tacacs+ using tacacs+
User was successfully authenticated.

sw1#test aaa group tacacs+ admin99 PASSWORD legacy
Attempting authentication test to server-group tacacs+ using tacacs+
User authentication request was rejected by server.

Even though the second attempt was rejected it still confirms that ACS rejected the request and is fully operational.

Step 1. Lets have a look at the ACS server. Once logged in navigate to "Monitoring and Reports" and click  "Launch Monitoring and Report Viewer"












Step 2. A new window pops up. Navigate to "Reports", "Catalog", and click "AAA Protocols".




















Step 3. On the right pain under reports click "TACACS Authentication. As you can see the first 2 entries correlate to what was seen on the switch. A pass and a fail.





Step 4. Lets look at some more details by clicking the magnifying glass under details. Lets look at the authentication that passed. As you can see there is alot of details. The big thing here is the "Status"









Step 5. Lets look at the authentication that was rejected. You can see the reason is identified. Wrong password :/











I will be adding a few more of these types of posts over the next week or so. Quick posts that provide specific detail on a particular topic.

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

VPN-IPSEC

Its been a while but I am going to try to post weekly.

Here is a sample configuration for IPSEC VPN between in 2 routers.
Note: 172.16.1.X/32 are loopback interfaces.








R1
Define IKE Phase 1 Policy (ISAKMP)
(config)#crytpo isakmp policy 10
(config-isakmp)#encryption aes 256
(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share
(config-isakmp)#hash sha
(config-isakmp)#group 2

Define pre-shared key
(config)#crypto isakmp key 0 $pass@word$ address 192.168.1.2

Define IKE Phase 2 Policy (IPSEC)
(config)#crypto ipsec transform-set TRANS-R1-R2 esp-aes 256 esp-sha-hmac

Create ACL to match interesting traffic
(config)#access-list 150 permit ip 172.16.1.1 0.0.0.0 172.16.1.2 0.0.0.0

Create Crypto Map
(config)#crypto map VPN-MAP-R1-R2 10 ipsec-isakmp
(config-crypto-map)#set peer 192.168.1.2
(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set TRANS-R1-R2
(config-crypto-map)#match address 150

Apply Cypto Map to Interface
(config)#interface fas0
(config-if)#crypto map VPN-MAP-R1-R2

Create a route
(config)#ip route 172.16.1.2 255.255.255.255 fas0

R2
Define IKE Phase 1 Policy (ISAKMP)
(config)#crytpo isakmp policy 10
(config-isakmp)#encryption aes 256
(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share
(config-isakmp)#hash sha
(config-isakmp)#group 2

Define pre-shared key
(config)#crypto isakmp kep 0 $pass@word$ address 192.168.1.1

Define IKE Phase 2 Policy (IPSEC)
(config)#crypto ipsec transform-set TRANS-R1-R2 esp-aes 256 esp-sha-hmac

Create ACL to match interesting traffic
(config)#access-list 150 permit 172.16.1.2 0.0.0.0 172.16.1.1 0.0.0.0

Create Crypto Map
(config)#crypto map VPN-MAP-R1-R2 10 ipsec-isakmp
(config-crypto-map)#set peer 192.168.1.1
(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set TRANS-R1-R2
(config-crypto-map)#match address 150

Apply Cypto Map to Interface
(config)#interface 0/1
(config-if)#crypto map VPN-MAP-R1-R2

Create a route
(config)#ip route 172.16.1.1 255.255.255.255 fas0


Sample Output from R2 - (After ping from R1 source lo0)

R2(config)#do show cry isa sa
IPv4 Crypto ISAKMP SA
dst             src             state          conn-id slot status
192.168.1.2     192.168.1.1     QM_IDLE           1001    0 ACTIVE

IPv6 Crypto ISAKMP SA





R2(config)#do show cry ipsec sa

interface: FastEthernet0
    Crypto map tag: VPN-MAP-R1-R2, local addr 192.168.1.2

   protected vrf: (none)
   local  ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (172.16.1.2/255.255.255.255/0/0)
   remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (172.16.1.1/255.255.255.255/0/0)
   current_peer 192.168.1.1 port 500
     PERMIT, flags={origin_is_acl,}
    #pkts encaps: 24, #pkts encrypt: 24, #pkts digest: 24
    #pkts decaps: 47, #pkts decrypt: 47, #pkts verify: 47
    #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
    #pkts not compressed: 0, #pkts compr. failed: 0
    #pkts not decompressed: 0, #pkts decompress failed: 0
    #send errors 0, #recv errors 0

     local crypto endpt.: 192.168.1.2, remote crypto endpt.: 192.168.1.1
     path mtu 1500, ip mtu 1500, ip mtu idb FastEthernet0
     current outbound spi: 0x6F76C310(1870054160)

     inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x1F2B01DC(522912220)
        transform: esp-256-aes esp-sha-hmac ,
        in use settings ={Tunnel, }
        conn id: 1, flow_id: 1, crypto map: VPN-MAP-R1-R2
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (k/sec): (4605243/2016)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Status: ACTIVE

     inbound ah sas:

     inbound pcp sas:

     outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x6F76C310(1870054160)
        transform: esp-256-aes esp-sha-hmac ,
        in use settings ={Tunnel, }
        conn id: 2, flow_id: 2, crypto map: VPN-MAP-R1-R2
        sa timing: remaining key lifetime (k/sec): (4605245/2011)
        IV size: 16 bytes
        replay detection support: Y
        Status: ACTIVE

     outbound ah sas:

     outbound pcp sas:


Wireshark capture - Anything sourced from R1 L0 is encrypted (ESP) when not sourcing from R1 L0 the packets are sent in clear text.